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ABSTRACT 
Social Capital and Analyst Forecasts 
by 
Jing Dai 
 
Advisor: Carol Marquardt 
This study examines the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. Using a 
county-level measure of social capital, I find that firms headquartered in counties with high 
social capital have greater forecast accuracy than firms headquartered in low social capital 
counties. In addition, I conduct two cross-sectional tests under conditions where social 
capital facilitates analyst forecast information collection and where social capital provides 
more assurance of information reliability. I find that the effect of social capital is more 
pronounced when firms’ headquarters are close to analyst brokerage firms. This is because 
geographically proximate analysts may have more channels to collect information. I also 
show that since high social capital can reduce analysts’ time and effort to verify the reported 
earnings when a firm has complicated operation, effect of social capital is more pronounced 
when a firm’s operation is complex. I also find that investors react more strongly to analyst 
forecast for firms headquartered in counties with low social capital, suggesting that the 
analyst’s role as an information intermediary is more valuable in this setting. Additionally, I 
employ the relocation of firms headquarters to better establish causality. The results are 
robust to regional fixed effect, accounting quality, management guidance, analyst fixed 
effect, and alternative measure of social capital. In sum, these findings suggest that social 
capital is an important factor that affects analysts forecast accuracy and informativenesss.  
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1 Introduction 
As important information intermediaries, financial analysts play a vital role in 
capital markets in interpreting and disseminating all kinds of information and in 
educating investors. The accuracy of analyst forecasts significantly affects investors’ 
decisions and aggregate market efficiency.  Prior studies find that analyst forecasts 
predict future earnings more accurately than time-series statistical models (Brown, 
Hagerman, and Zmijewski 1987b), facilitate more accurate pricing of accruals (Barth and 
Hutton 2004), and convey information to the capital market (Lys and Sohn 1990; Francis 
and Soffer 1997; Gleason and Lee 2003). To better identify analysts who can more 
accurately forecast earnings, many studies have explored the role of analyst or firm 
characteristics (e.g., Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols 2001; Lang, Lins, and Miller 2004; Tan, Wang, 
and Welker 2011).  However, there are no extant studies examining the influence of firms’ 
local social environment on analyst forecast accuracy. This study intends to shed light on 
the black box of analyst forecast process by focusing on the impact of county-level social 
capital on analyst forecast accuracy.  
As applied in the social science and economics literature, the term “social capital” 
generally encompasses notions of trust, cooperative norms, and association within groups. 
In the economics literature, researchers typically view social capital as a set of beliefs and 
values that foster cooperation, such as propensities to honor obligations, mutual trust, 
altruism and community-centric attitudes (Knack and Keefer 1997; Whiteley 2000; 
Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2000; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004). In the 
management literature, social capital is usually viewed as social networks from which 
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interest parties can obtain benefit (Baker 1990; Burt 1995; Adler 2009). In the political 
science literature, Putnam (1995) defines social capital as the features of social 
organizations, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit. In the accounting literature, studies find that social capital 
improves financial reporting quality (Jha 2013), reduces audit fees (Jha and Chen 2015), 
lowers loan spread (Cheng, Wang, and Zhao 2016) and municipal bond yields (Li, Tang, 
and Jaggi 2016), facilitates tax filing compliance (Alm, Clark, and Leibel 2011), and 
enhances the likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast (Lu 2014). 
Accounting researchers typically adopt the definition of Woolcock (2001) that social 
capital is the set of norms and networks that facilitate collective action. Consistent with 
this definition, I also adopt Woolcock (2001) definition and emphasize several vital 
aspects of social capital, namely, mutual trust, propensities to honor obligations, altruism, 
and civic and social associations.  
According to social identity theory, a portion of a person’s self-concept is based 
upon the perception of his social group (Turner and Oakes, 1986), which provides 
support to the argument that a firm’s culture is consistent with its regional culture. 
Therefore, managers in high social capital counties are expected to value mutual trust and 
altruism and honor legitimacy and obligation. As such, they are less likely to manage 
earnings, commit financial fraud, or release misleading management forecasts (Jha 2013).  
In addition, they are more likely to disclose and disclosure tend to be more sepcific (Lu 
2014). Therefore, the information analysts rely on to predict earnings is more reliable and 
useful. Dense social networks in high social capital counties can also facilitate 
information collection. Thus, I expect firms headquartered in counties with high social 
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capital will have more accurate analyst forecasts. It is possible, however, that since 
managers in high social capital counties are less likely to manipulate earnings or smooth 
earnings over time to meet analyst forecasts, firms headquartered in high social capital 
counties may have less accurate analyst forecasts.
1
 How social capital affects analyst 
forecast accuracy thus becomes an open empirical question. 
To construct a comprehensive county-level index to measure social capital, I 
follow steps in Rupasingha and Goetz (2008). Using principal component analysis, I 
build the county-level social capital index based on four factors: the census response rate, 
the voter rate, the number of social and civic associations, and the number of 
nongovernment organizations in each county. Consistent with the argument of Guiso et al. 
(2004), Jha (2015), and Cheng et al. (2016), this index captures the resources that accrue 
to people as a result of participation in social networks. Following Dhaliwal and 
Radhakrishnan (2012), I also use analyst forecast error as an inverse measure of forecast 
accuracy. Analyst forecast error (Forecast Error) is defined as the average of all absolute 
value of differences between analyst forecast and its target earnings, divided by the stock 
price at the beginning of the year. 
 I employ a sample of 28,005 firm-years from 1990 to 2009 to examine the effect 
of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. I find that social capital is significantly and 
positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for firm, analyst, and 
county characteristics. One standard deviation increase in the county-level social capital 
index increases analyst forecast accuracy by 6.656%, indicating that my results are also 
                                                          
1
 The analysts’ consensus earnings forecast is an important target for public firms (Brown and Caylor 2005). 
Therefore, managers exert considerable effort to meet or beat this benchmark (Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005). 
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economically significant. Overall, these results provide evidence that firms headquartered 
in high social capital counties have more accurate analyst forecasts. 
 I next conduct two cross-sectional tests to examine whether the effect of social 
capital on analyst forecast accuracy is relatively more or less pronounced when social 
norms and social connections play important roles. First, I examine the role of social 
connections by testing the effect of social capital on analyst forecasts when analysts are 
close to the firms. On the one hand, analysts located close to a firm may enjoy an 
information advantage, which suggests that geographically proximate analysts can more 
accurately predict earnings. On the other hand, when analyst brokerage firms locate close 
to firms, analysts can collect information through alternative sources (e.g., local media 
and direct observation of firms’ operations). Therefore, it is unclear whether the effect of 
social capital on analyst forecast accuracy varies systematically with geographical 
proximity to analyst brokerage firms. Second, I examine the role of social norms by 
comparing the forecasts of firms with high operation complexity to those with low 
operation complexity. When a firm’s operation is complex, analysts are more likely to 
fail to incorporate all available information into their earnings forecasts due to the 
limitation on time and ability. An increase in operation complexity may thus reduce 
analyst forecast accuracy (Gu and Wang 2005; Plumlee 2003). High social capital, 
however, may mitigate the effect of operation complexity by increasing credibility of the 
reported numbers. Alternatively, when information is complex, it is well known that 
managers will issue more voluntary disclosure to increase the average precision of 
investors’ beliefs about future cash flow (Kim and Verrecchia 1991; Verrecchina 1990; 
Guay, Samuels, and Taylor 2016), which may supersede the role of social capital. 
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Therefore, it is also unclear whether the effect of social capital on analyst forecast 
accuracy is affected by a firm’s operations complexity. 
Employing the spatial distance between the firm and the analyst brokerage firm as 
the proxy for geographic proximity, I find that the effect of county-level social capital on 
analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced when analyst brokerage firms are close to 
firms, suggesting that social capital facilitates geographically proximate analysts’ 
information collection through intense social connection with local employees, suppliers, 
customers, bankers, and competitors. Following prior studies, I use the number of 
business segments as a measure of a firm’s operation complexity because the more 
business segments a firm operates, the more uncertain environment the firm faces, the 
more technical supports the firm needs, the more stakeholders the firm copes with, and 
the more difficult for managers to make decision (Markarian and Parbonetti 2007; 
Barinov, Shawn, and Yildizhan 2016). I find that the effect of county-level social capital 
is more pronounced when a firm’s operations are more complex, indicating that social 
capital facilitates analyst information collection and makes managers less likely to use 
complexity as a cover to manipulate earnings. 
Since analyst forecasts represent a primary information resource for investors, it is 
important to understand whether information conveyed to capital market by analyst 
forecasts varies with social capital. I therefore examine whether social capital affects the 
analyst forecast informativeness. Following prior studies (e.g., Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 
2004; Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 2006),  I calculate informativeness as the sum of the 
absolute market adjusted returns on the analyst forecasts revision dates for a firm in a 
given fiscal year, scaled by the number of analyst forecast revision days for the firm in 
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the fiscal year. I find that analyst forecasts are more useful and informative to investors 
for firms headquartered in low social capital counties where managers’ credibility is also 
low, which suggests that analyst forecasts serve as a substitutional role for managers’ 
credibility (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988, Subramanyam 1996). 
The empirical tests thus far suggest that social capital and analyst forecast 
accuracy are significantly associated. Following Cheng et al. (2016), I employ firms’ 
headquarters relocations to better establish causality. Using a sample of firms’ relocating 
their headquarters, I dichotomize the sample into firms that move to a county with higher 
social capital and those that move to a county with lower social capital. I find that analyst 
forecast error and informativeness decrease when a firm relocates to a higher social 
capital county and vice versa. These results further provide the evidence that increase in 
social capital results in the decrease in analyst forecast errors and informativess and vice 
versa. Then I conduct several robustness tests and find that my results are robust to 
regional fixed effect, accounting quality, management guidance, analyst fixed effect, and 
alternative measure of social capital. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. My study extends an 
emerging stream of accounting literature that documents the effect of social capital on 
firms’ behaviors (Alm, Clark, and Leibel 2011; Jha 2013; Jha 2014; Jha and Chen 2015; 
Cheng et al. 2016; Li, Tang, and Jaggi 2016). To my knowledge, it is the first study 
examines that effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. I find that the social 
environment in which a firm’s headquarter is located can improve the firm’s analyst 
forecast accuracy through social norms and social connections.  
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Second, this study sheds light on the black box of analyst forecast process. 
Although analysts are important information intermediaries, prior literature has not 
thoroughly examined the black box of how analysts process their forecasts. Ramnath, 
Rock, and Shane (2008), Bradshaw (2011), and Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) 
conclude that research on the black box of analysts’ decision process is required for 
further studies to progress. This study provides evidence that social capital is an 
important factor that influences analysts’ ability to obtain reliable information, and, in 
turn, more accurately forecast earnings.  
Thirdly, this study provides evidence of how the information conveyed to 
investors by analysts varies with social capital. In prior literature, it is unclear whether 
analyst forecasts serve a substitutional role (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988, 
Subramanyam 1996) or complementary role for financial reporting quality (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2002; Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 
2006). Consistent with Holthausenand Verrecchia 1988 and Subramanyam 1996, the 
results in my tests show that analyst forecasts are more useful for investors when firms 
are headquartered in low social capital locales where managers’ credibility is low, 
indicating that analyst forecasts serve a substitutional role for managers’ credibility.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 develops the measure of social capital and research 
methodology and discusses sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results. Section 5 reports robustness tests and section 6 concludes. 
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2 Background                                                                                                                    
2.1 Social Capital 
Since Coleman (1988) first paralleled social capital with other types of capital, 
such as financial, physical, and human, it has attracted increasing attention in economics, 
management, and political science (Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001; Payne, Moore, Griffis, 
and Autry 2011). Although the definition of social capital has varied, it is generally 
perceived as encompassing notions of trust, cooperative norms, and associations within 
groups. In the economics literature, researchers view social capital as a set of beliefs and 
values that foster cooperation, such as propensities to honor obligations, mutual trust, 
altruism, and community-centric attitudes (Knack and Keefer 1997; Whiteley 2000; 
Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2000; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004). In the 
management literature, social capital is usually regarded as a social network from which 
interest parties can obtain benefit. For example, Burt (1992) defines social capital as 
“through friends, colleagues, and more general contacts the player receives opportunities 
to use his or her financial and human capital.” Baker (1990) describes social capital as “a 
resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their 
interests.” Adler (2009) views social capital as “a resource for individual and collective 
actors created by the configuration and content of the network of their more or less 
durable social relations.”  In the political science literature, Putnam (1995) defines it as 
features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.  
Since Jha (2013) introduced social capital into the accounting literature, several 
studies have examined the impact of social capital on stakeholders. Prior studies find that 
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social capital improves financial reporting quality (Jha 2013), reduces audit fees (Jha and 
Chen 2015), lowers loan spread (Cheng, Wang, Zhang, and Zhao 2016) and municipal 
bond yields (Li, Tang, and Jaggi 2016), facilitates tax filing compliance (Alm, Clark, and 
Leibel 2011), and enhances the likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast (Lu 
2014). Researchers typically take the definition of social capital by Woolcock (2001) that 
social capital is norms and networks that facilitate collective action. Taking the core 
concepts of social capital and conventional agreements on social capital into 
consideration, I also adopt the definition of Woolcock (2001) and emphasize several vital 
aspects of social capital, namely, mutual trust, propensities to honor obligations, altruism, 
and civic and social associations.                                                                                
 2.2 Benefits of Social Capital 
Social capital fosters economic growth through facilitating information sharing, 
reducing transaction costs, and increasing investments in public goods, thereby making 
contracts more efficient and enhancing cooperation. Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 
(2000) argue that “good” social capital reduces information and transaction costs and 
increase investments in public goods and find that social capital has a statistically 
significant and positive effect on the rate of per-capita income growth. Whiteley (2000) 
shows that social capital can enhance economic growth through both direct and indirect 
mechanisms. The direct mechanism works via reducing transaction costs, creating a high 
trust society in which principal-agent problems are much less significant. The indirect 
mechanism works via interaction between social and human and physical capital. Using 
indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys, Knack and Keefer 
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(1997) document that trust and civic cooperation are two important dimensions of social 
capital that are associated with stronger economic performance. 
In management studies, researchers have documented that social capital is 
conducive to the development of both organizations and individuals within those 
organizations. Burt (1992) and Podolny and Baron (1997) find that an individual’s career 
advancement is enhanced by a network for acquiring information and resources. Using 
data from multiple respondents in all the business units of a large multinational 
electronics company, Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) shows that social capital increases the 
extent of interunit resource exchange and product innovation. Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998) documents that social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital and 
firms with high social capital have an advantage over markets in creating and sharing 
intellectual capital. Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) demonstrates that social capital can 
nurture the network formation of start-ups firms. 
Social capital also plays a vital role in financial markets. Jha (2013) shows that 
financial reporting quality is higher when a firm is headquartered in a high social capital 
region because both the altruistic norms and the dense networks in a high social capital 
region induce the managers to report financial conditions truthfully. Jha and Chen (2015) 
focuses on the dimension of mutual trust in social capital and finds that auditors judge the 
trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered and charge a 
premium when they trust the firm less.  Cheng et al. (2016) documents that firms with 
higher social capital are associated with lower loan spread as firms headquartered in high 
social capital counties are more likely to honor obligations and less likely to default. 
Other studies also document that firms headquartered in high social capital counties have 
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better tax filing compliance (Alm, Clark, and Leibel 2011), higher likelihood of issuing a 
management earnings forecast (Lu 2014), higher corporate social responsibility (Jha and 
Chen 2015), and lower municipal bond yields (Li, Tang, and Jaggi 2016). 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
2.3.1 Social Capital and Analyst Forecast 
 
Social identity theory provides support to the argument that a firm’s culture is 
consistent with its regional culture. According to social identity theory, a portion of 
person’s self-concept is based upon the perception of his social group (Turner and Oakes 
1986). Therefore, the thinking, values, and actions of firm managers and other employees 
are influenced by their regional culture, resulting in an alignment between whole firm 
culture and regional culture. As such, a firm headquartered in county with high social 
capital also has high social capital and congruent social values and vice versa.  
Based on social identity theory, I expect that a firm headquartered in a county 
with high social capital will have more accurate analyst forecasts. Analysts forecast firms’ 
earnings based on two main information resources, namely, management guidance and 
annual reports (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barker and Imam 2008). Due to managers’ 
reporting incentives and stock based compensation, managers may report annual reports 
and disclose management guidance in a way to satisfy their own self-interest through 
accrual-based earning management, real earnings management, and misleading 
management forecast, inducing bias into these two information resources (e.g., Summers 
and Sweeney 1998; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Cheng and Lo 2006). Managers in 
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a high social capital locale, however, value mutual trust and altruism and honor 
legitimacy and obligation. Therefore they are less likely to manage earnings, commit 
financial fraud, and disclose misleading management forecasts (Jha 2013; Lu 2014), 
which reduce the management-induced bias in the information conveyed to the market. 
Therefore, social capital enhances the credibility of the information on which analysts 
rely.
2
 In addition, dense social networks in the high social capital county can reduce 
information asymmetry between firms and analysts by facilitating information collection 
in terms of cost, timeliness, and volume. To the extent that social capital enhances the 
precision, timeliness, and volume of information that analysts have received, analysts’ 
uncertainty about firms’ operations and financial position will decrease, and in turn 
analyst forecast accuracy is expected to increase with social capital. 
Alternatively, it is possible that firms headquartered in high social capital locales 
have less accurate analyst forecasts. Analysts’ consensus earnings forecast is an 
important target for public firms (Brown and Caylor 2005). Therefore, managers exert 
considerable effort to meet or beat these targets (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). 
Since managers’ altruism and honor of legitimacy and obligation can reduce earnings 
management (Jha 2013), managers may be less likely to manipulate earnings or smooth 
earnings over time to meet analyst forecasts. Because smooth earnings can facilitate 
analyst forecasts, high social capital may lead to more variable reported earnings and 
reduce analyst forecast accuracy. For this reason, I state my first hypothesis in null form. 
                                                          
2
 It is possible that bias in annual financial reports and management guidance could result from 
unintentional errors. This type of bias can also be mitigated by the influence of social capital on managers’ 
behaviors. Since managers in a high social capital locale are more likely to truthfully report their firms’ 
financial position and business operations, once material discrepancy between their previous disclosures 
and most recent expectation is revealed, they are also more likely to disclose updated expectation through 
forecast revisions, press releases and all other possible channels and tools. As such, analysts can predict 
earnings based on more timely information. 
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  H1: There is no effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. 
2.3.2 Impact of Geographic Proximity on the Effect of Social Capital  
 
Geographic proximity between firms and their analysts may play an important 
role on the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. On the one hand, analysts 
located close to a firm may enjoy an information advantage through social connections. 
Analysts who join the same clubs as their following firms’ managers or have common 
friends or families with the managers are more likely to obtain valuable “soft” 
information and incorporate this information into their earnings forecast. In addition, 
Malloy (2005) and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) point out that geographically proximate 
analysts may have better access to information via personal connections to management, 
local employees, customers, and competitors.  Therefore, analysts can collect more 
information in a timelier and less costly way through dense social connections, reducing 
the information asymmetry between firms and analysts. As such, social capital is 
conducive for the geographically proximate analysts to more accurately predict earnings. 
On the other hand, when analysts locate close to a firm, they can collect information 
through alternative sources, e.g., local media and newspapers. In addition, they can 
directly observe firm’s day-to-day operations. For instance, if a firm is unusually busy, 
analysts might observe many trucks being loaded (Bae et al. 2008). Therefore, these 
alternative channels of information gathering may supersede the role of social capital. If 
so, I conjecture that the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is less 
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pronounced when analysts locate close to a firm.  I therefore state my second hypothesis 
in null form: 
H2:  The effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is not affected by the 
geographic proximity between a firm and its analyst brokerage firms. 
2.3.3 Impact of Operation Complexity on the Effect of Social Capital  
 
Li (2008) finds that managers use operation complexity to hide or obfuscate 
information, such as poor performance. Analysts’ time and energy are limited when they 
perform their tasks. Therefore, when a firm’s business transaction and operation are 
complicated, it takes analysts more time and effort to process and analyze business model. 
In addition, analysts are more likely to fail to incorporate all available information into 
their earnings forecasts due to limitations of time and ability. As a result, analyst forecast 
accuracy is more likely to be compromised. Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016) also show 
that the complexity of the firm’s business transactions can lead to financial reporting 
complexity. When financial reporting is complex, it is harder for analysts to verify the 
information. Therefore, an increase in a firm’s operation complexity will reduce its 
analyst forecast accuracy (e.g., Plumlee 2003; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011; Bozanic 
and Thevenot 2015). Social capital, however, may mitigate the effect of operation 
complexity on analyst forecast accuracy. Because managers in high social capital 
counties usually value mutual trust and altruism and honor legitimacy and obligation, 
they are more likely to truthfully report their operations and less likely to intentionally 
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use the complexity to hide and obfuscate information. If so, the effect of social capital on 
analyst forecast would be strong when the social capital is high. 
 Alternatively, managers’ voluntary disclosure due to information asymmetry may 
supersede the role of social capital. Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016) also documents 
that managers issue more voluntary disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry when 
information is complicated.  When information is complex, information processing costs 
increases, which result in a decrease in the average precision of investors’ beliefs about 
future cash flow (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991). Verrecchina (1990) shows that a decrease 
in average precision of investors’ beliefs about future cash flow leads to an increase in 
voluntary disclosure. With sufficient information supplied by managers, analyst forecasts 
may be more accurate. Therefore, the increase in analyst forecast accuracy may be caused 
by managers’ voluntary disclosure instead of social capital.3 If so, I conjecture that the 
effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is less pronounced when firms’ 
operations are complex.  I therefore state my third hypothesis in null form: 
           H3: The effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is not affected by   
                 a firm’s operations complexity. 
2.3.4 Social Capital and Analyst Forecast Informativeness  
Since analyst forecasts are one of the main resources investors rely upon making 
investment decisions, it is important to understand whether and how the information 
                                                          
3
 Although Lu (2014) shows that social capital also increases voluntary disclosure, it is because managers 
are more likely to be concerned about their reputation of providing transparent information in the high 
social capital locales where social connections are dense and people have greater propensities to honor 
legitimacy and obligations. This concern is different from the incentive of increasing the average precision 
of investors’ beliefs about future cash flow. 
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conveyed to investors by analyst varies with social capital. Jha (2013) documents that 
social capital has a statistically significant and positive effect on financial reporting 
quality because the altruistic norms and dense networks in high social capital region are 
more likely to induce managers to truthfully report financial conditions. However, it is 
unclear how financial reporting quality influences analyst forecasts informativeness. One 
stream of studies shows that analyst forecasts and firms’ financial reporting quality are 
substitutes because investors demand alternative information when firms’ information is 
obscure (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988, Subramanyam 1996). In contrast, another 
stream of studies posits that analyst forecasts and firms’ financial reporting quality are 
complements because high financial reporting quality will reduce analysts’ cost of 
supplying informativeness (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 
2002; Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 2006). 
If analyst forecasts are substitutes for financial reporting quality, analyst forecasts 
of firms headquartered in low social capital locales are expected to be more informative 
and valuable for investors. This argument is also consistent with the idea of Cheng and 
Jha (2015) and Li, Tang, and Jaggi (2016), i.e., social capital plays an important role in 
substituting for managers’ credibility and providing more insights to interested parties, 
namely auditors, creditors, and investors. Moreover, if analyst forecasts are complements 
for financial reporting quality, analyst forecasts of firms headquartered in low social 
capital locales are expected to be less informative because low financial reporting quality 
makes it harder and more costly for analysts to supply informativeness. 
Therefore, I state my fourth hypothesis in null form. 
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H4: Social capital has no effect on analyst forecast informativeness. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Measure of Social Capital 
Different methods have been used to measure social capital in the prior studies: 
the level of trust from survey data (e.g., Whiteley 2000), indicators of norms from the 
World Values Surveys (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997), tax filing compliance (e.g., Alm, 
Clark, and Leibel 2011), and the number of associations (e.g., Laursen, Masciarelli, and 
Prencipe 2012). Although these measures have been successfully used to varying degrees, 
it is difficult for a single measure to completely capture the multiple dimensions of social 
capital. In recent accounting studies, researchers typically follow Rupasingha and Goetz 
(2008) to use a comprehensive county-level index of social capital. In this study, I also 
adopt this method to measure social capital. Specifically, I construct a county-level social 
capital index using principal component analysis of four factors: the census response rate, 
the voter rate, the number of social and civic associations; and the number of 
nongovernment organizations in each county. 
The census response rate and voter rate are used to capture social norms. Since 
there are only very small economic incentives or legal incentives for people to vote and 
engage in this civic activity, the decision to participate in these voluntary activities is 
mainly motivated by social pressure and internal norms. Higher values of the census 
response rate and voter rate represent higher social norms. The census response rate is the 
response rate to the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial census. The voter rate is the number 
of votes cast, scaled by the population above 18 years old (times 100). 
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The number of social and civic associations and the number of nongovernment 
organizations in each county are used to capture social networks. Social capital manifests 
itself in individuals through their participation in associational activities (Rupasingha, 
Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). In particular, Putnam (1995) points out that individuals’ 
participation in associational activities instills in their members’ habits of economic 
cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness. Such activities facilitate information 
sharing through repeated interactions and these interactions promote reciprocity 
(Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). The higher the number of social and civic 
associations and the number of nongovernment organization in each county, the denser 
the social networks. Specifically, the number of social and civic associations is the sum 
of the religious organizations, civic and social associations, business associations, 
political organizations, professional organizations, labor organizations, bowling centers, 
physical fitness facilities, public golf courses, sport clubs, managers and promoters, 
membership sports and recreation clubs, and membership organizations. As in prior 
studies (Rupasingha and Goetz 2008, Jha and Chen 2015), the total amount is divided by 
12 because there are 12 different categories and then scaled by the population. The 
number of nongovernment organizations is the sum of nongovernment organizations, 
excluding those with an international focus, divided by population (multiplied by 10,000). 
As in prior studies (Rupasingha and Goetz 2008, Jha and Chen 2015), because the 
four input variables are only available in 1990, 1997, 2005, and 2009, I calculate the 
social capital index by principal component analysis for these four years and then linearly 
interpolate values to fill the missing years. After constructing the social capital index, I 
match it to each firm’s headquarter through zip codes. Since Compustat does not provide 
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the historical zip code of a firm’s headquarter, I perform a textual analysis on firms’ 10-K 
filings downloaded from SEC’s EDGAR system to extract firms’ historical zip code. 
Therefore, I match county-level social capital index to firms’ headquarters using a 
dynamic zip code. 
3.2 Research Design 
 
Hypothesis H1 examines the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. 
County-level social capital index is constructed as described above. Following Dhaliwal 
and Radhakrishnan (2012), I use analyst forecast error as an inverse measure of forecast 
accuracy. Analyst forecast error (Forecast Error) is defined as the mean of the absolute 
differences between an analyst’s most recent forecast and its actual target earnings, 
divided by the stock price at the beginning of the year, as follows
4
: 
                                        𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ |𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡,𝑚−𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡|
𝑛
𝑚=1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
.                                        (1) 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡,𝑚 denotes the most recent forecast m issued for firm i in year t, 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
actual earnings of firm i in year t,  𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the stock price of firm i at the beginning of the 
year t, and n is the number of analyst’s forecasts issuing for firm i. 
To test hypothesis H1, I employ the following ordinary lease squares (OLS) 
regression model: 
                                                          
4
 If an analyst issues multiple forecasts for a firm, only the most recent forecast is used. 
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𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
+ 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀. 5                   (2) 
The independent variable of interest in this specification is the county-level social 
capital index. Since H1 is in null form, I do not make a prediction regarding the sign of 
the coefficient 𝛼1. 
I control for firm-level, analyst-level and county-level characteristics that may 
affect analyst forecast accuracy. For firm characteristic, I control for firm size, market-to-
book, intangible assets, annual stock return, stock turnover, security issuance, and five-
year stock return volatility. These variables are drawn from the prior literature that shows 
that they affect analyst forecast accuracy in at least some circumstances (e.g., Bhushan 
1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barth, Kasznik, and 
McNichols 2001; Lang, Lins, and Miller 2004; Tan, Wang, and Welker 2011). 
Analyst characteristic controls include the number of analysts following the firm, 
forecast horizon, the number of firms analysts cover, analyst general experience, analyst 
firm-specific experience, and brokerage size. All of these variables are aggregated to 
firm-level. The number of analysts represents the intensity of competition in the market 
and is used to control for incentives to forecast accurately (Lys and Soo 1995). Jacob, Lys, 
and Neale (1999) shows that the length of forecast horizon is negatively associated with 
analyst forecast accuracy because greater forecast horizon is more likely to lead the 
                                                          
5
 In an expanded specification, corporate governance measures are added but limit the sample to S&P 1,500 
firms because all corporate governance measures come from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics). ISS only includes 
S&P 1,500 firms. 
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information collected by analysts to be less accurate. Since analysts who cover more 
firms, have greater general and firm-specific experience, and work for larger brokerage 
firm are more likely to be capable analysts and have more information resources 
(Clement 1999), their forecasts are also likely to be more accurate due to their 
outstanding ability. Moreover, the heavy workload may also stretch analysts’ time and 
effort, making the forecast less accurate. Therefore, I do not make a prediction on the 
association between these variables and analyst forecast accuracy. 
To ensure that my findings are not driven by county characteristics, I add county 
controls to the model. Recent studies show that a religious culture leads to more ethical 
and less risky behavior (McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 2012; Jiang, Li and Qian 2013; Omer, 
Sharp, and Wang 2016). Although religiosity is overlapped with social capital, social 
capital captures social norms and social connections more comprehensively than 
religiosity. Religiosity is therefore included in all model specification to show that social 
capital has incremental explanatory power over religiosity. To control for the economic 
characteristic in a county, I include income per capita, population, population growth, 
education level, and rurality. 
Better corporate governance induces stronger monitoring of firms’ financial 
reporting and disclosure behavior, which in turn may increase analyst forecast accuracy. 
To mitigate the concern that my results are driven by variation in corporate governance 
practices, I add corporate governance measures to an expanded specification: Litigation 
risk is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm belongs to high-risk industry and zero 
otherwise. Dual is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chair of the 
board of directors and zero otherwise. Independent percentage is the percentage of 
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independent directors on the board. Financial expert is the number of directors with 
financial or accounting expertise divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Corporate governance measures come from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics), which only 
includes S&P 1500 firms and therefore limits my sample size. Year and industry fixed 
effects are included to control for other unobservable or missing characteristics across 
years and industries. Standard errors are clustered at the county level to control for 
potentially correlated error terms. 
In H2, I examine whether the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy 
is affected by the average geographic proximity between a firm and its analyst brokerage 
firms.  To calculate the distance, I first obtain brokerage firm codes and analysts codes 
and merge them to the I/B/E/S Broker Translation File to identify brokerage firms’ names. 
I then manually match each brokerage firm name with entries from Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Research, which provides the zip code of the brokerage firm headquarter.
6
 
With the firm headquarter historical zip code extracted from its annual 10-K filing from 
EDGAR and brokerage firms’ zip code, I calculate the spatial distance between the firm 
headquarter and its brokerage firms. The average value of all distances between a firm 
and its analyst brokerage firms is used to measure the analyst geographic proximity. I add 
the interactive term of social capital and distance into models and test whether the effect 
of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy varies the analyst geographic proximity. 
Hypothesis H3 examines whether a firm’s operation complexity affect the effect 
of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. Similar to prior studies, I use the number of 
                                                          
6
 Since I can only get access to Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research from 2002-2008, I end up a 
sample with 5,855 observations after eliminating observations with missing data. 
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business segments as a measure of a firm’s operation complexity because the more 
business segments a firm operates, the more uncertain environment the firm faces, the 
more technical supports the firm needs, the more stakeholders the firm copes with, and 
the more difficult it is for managers to make decisions (Markarian and Parbonetti 2007; 
Barinov, Shawn, and Yildizhan 2016). The number of business segments is obtained from 
Compustat-Segments. I add the number of business segments and the interactive term of 
social capital and the number of business segments into equation 2 and test whether the 
effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is affected by a firm’s operation 
complexity. 
Hypothesis H4 is intended to provide insight into how market participants 
perceive the effect of social capital the informativeness of on analyst forecasts. To test 
hypothesis H4, I employ the following ordinary least square (OLS) regression: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
+ 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀.                (3) 
Following prior studies (e.g., Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 2004; Frankel, Kothari, and 
Weber 2006), I calculate INFO as the sum of the absolute market adjusted returns (𝑅𝑚) 
on the analyst forecasts revision dates (m) for a firm (i) in a given fiscal year (t), scaled 
by the number of analyst forecast revision days for the firm in the fiscal year 
(𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑚).
7
 Similar to Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 2006, I delete all analyst 
                                                          
7
 Untabulated table show that the results are robust when the market adjusted returns on a single analyst 
forecast revision date(𝑅𝑚)  is replaced as a 3-day market adjusted returns centered at analyst forecast 
date. 
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report dates within a 3-day window centered on quarterly and annual earnings 
announcement dates to avoid contamination by earnings announcement period volatility. 
INFO is constructed to measure the average informativeness of an analyst report date for 
a firm. 
                                                 INFO𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ |𝑅𝑚|
𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑡=1
𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
.                                                   (4)    
If the coefficient on social capital is significantly negative, it indicates that market 
participants perceive that analyst forecasts for firms headquartered in low social capital 
counties are more informative, which is consistent with analyst forecasts’ substitutional 
role for financial reporting quality. In contrast, if the coefficient on social capital is 
positive, it suggests that investors perceive that analyst forecasts for firms headquartered 
in high social capital counties are more informative, which is consistent with analyst 
forecasts’ complementary role for financial reporting quality. 
 3.3 Sample Selection 
 
I obtain sample data from the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development 
(NERCRD), Compustat, SEC’s online EDGAR system, I/B/E/S, CRSP, ISS (formerly 
RiskMetrics), and Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research for 2002-2008. I first 
construct the county-level social capital index using the data from NERCRD and the 
procedures described earlier. Then I match the social capital index to firms’ headquarters 
through historical zip codes extracted from 10-K filings restored on SEC’s EDGAR 
system. Since NERCRD survey are only available for 1990-2009 and controls are one 
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year lagged, my sample spans years 1989 to 2009. All firm-level financial characteristics 
are obtained from Compustat and CRSP and analyst forecast data is from I/B/E/S. Firms 
in financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities industries (SIC codes 4000-
4999) are excluded because their financial reporting and capital structure are likely to be 
different from those of other firms. After omitting observations due to missing values, my 
final sample consists of 28,005 firm-years. Since ISS only provides director 
characteristics for S&P 1500 firms, the models that include corporate governance 
variables are estimated using a smaller sample comprised of 12,140 firm-years. Panel A 
of  Table 1 panel shows the sample selection procedure.  
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and 
medians) for my sample. To minimize the impact of outliers, I winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile values.  The mean value for social capital is -0.54, 
which is similar to prior studies (Jha and Chen 2015; Cheng et al. 2016; Li, Tang, and 
Jaggi 2016). The top three states and territory with highest social capital are North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and District of Columbia. The three states with lowest social 
capital are Nevada, Arizona, and Georgia. Average forecast error is 0.06, which is also 
consistent with prior studies (Hope 2003; Dhaliwal and Radhakrishnan 2012). 
Informativeness averaged across all firms is 0.05. Firms in the sample have 2.64 
segments on average. The average distance between firms and analysts is 1128.63 
kilometers. The statistics for all of my measures are similar to those in the prior literature. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Table 2 reports correlation coefficients for all variables. It shows that county-level 
social capital is significantly and negatively correlated with analyst forecast error, 
indicating that a higher county-level social capital is associated with less analyst forecast 
error (higher analyst forecast accuracy). Informativeness is also significantly and 
negatively correlated with social capital, suggesting that analyst forecasts are more useful 
and informative to investor when firms are headquartered in low social capital locales. 
Most of the correlations are less than 0.4, which is far less than the 0.8 threshold beyond 
which multicollinearity may be a concern (Gujarati 2003). I also calculate the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) for variable pairs with a correlation coefficient higher than 0.4 to 
further detect multicollinearity issues. Untabulated results show that none of the values 
for VIF is greater than the 10 threshold that would suggest multicollinearity. Pearson and 
Spearman correlations are similar in magnitudes, indicating that there are no obvious 
outliers.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
To more vividly and directly demonstrate the relationship between social capital 
and analyst forecast error and the relationship between social capital and analyst forecast 
informativeness, I graphically plot the social capital, analyst forecast errors, and analyst 
forecast informativeness of 2009 for each state in Figure 1a, Figure 1b and Figure 1c, 
respectively. For brevity, I do not present the figures for other years. In Figure 1a, I take 
the average value of all county-level social capitals in each state to represent state-level 
social capital. Then I plot the state-level social capital and show the variations in social 
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capital at the state level.
8
 A darker color represents a higher social capital. It shows that 
states in the Midwest and the Northeast have higher social capital than other areas. Social 
capital does not change much over time. The correlation between the 1990 and the 2009 
social capital index is 0.96, which is consistent with the idea that unlike physical and 
human capital, social capital is “sticky” (Anheier and Gerhards 1995). In Figure 1b, I 
aggregate the analyst forecast errors to the state level and take the average value to 
measure the state-level analyst forecast errors. A darker color represents a more accurate 
analyst forecast (less analyst forecast errors). Firms headquartered in the Midwest and the 
Northeast have more accurate analyst forecasts. Taking Figure 1a and Figure 1b together, 
I find that the states with high social capital generally have more accurate analyst forecast. 
In Figure 1c, I plot the state-level average analyst forecast informativeness. The darker 
the color, the more informative the analyst forecast. Taking Figure 1a and Figure 1c 
together, I find that low social capital states generally have more informative analyst 
forecast, indicating analyst forecast is more useful to investor when social capital is low. 
[INSERT Figure 1a, Figure 1b, and Figure 1c HERE] 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Main Results 
 
Table 3 presents my tests of H1, the effect of county-level social capital on 
analyst forecast accuracy. Column 1 presents the result for the main model in equation (1) 
and Column 2 shows the result for the expanded model, which adds corporate governance 
                                                          
8
 Untabulated county-level social capital figure shows similar variance pattern to state-level figure. 
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controls to the main model. In both columns, the coefficient on Social Capital is negative 
and significant at p-value of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively, suggesting that firms 
headquartered in counties with high social capital have smaller analyst forecast errors, i.e., 
more accurate analyst forecasts. The coefficient on Social Capital in Column 1 (Column 
2) shows that one standard deviation increase in the county-level social capital index 
reduces the absolute value of analyst earning forecast error by 0.399% (0.397%) of stock 
price.
9
 Since the average absolute value of forecast errors of the base price is 6%, 0.399% 
(0.397%) reduction in forecast error increases the forecast accuracy by 6.656% (6.615%), 
indicating my results are also economically significant. To mitigate my results are driven 
by the increased financial reporting and improved disclosure behavior associated with 
better corporate governance, I control for corporate governance in Column 2. The 
coefficient on Social Capital is still negative and significant, suggesting that social capital 
still exhibits an incremental effect on analyst forecast accuracy. 
The results for the firm characteristic control variables show that size, intangible 
assets, return volatility, and stock turnover are significantly and negatively associated 
with analyst forecast accuracy. The results suggest that these variables may capture 
complexity and uncertainty in firm’s operation, making the prediction of future earnings 
more difficult. Market-to-book ratio is significantly and positively related to analyst 
forecast accuracy, indicating profitable firms have more accurate analyst forecasts. With 
regard to analyst characteristics, firms with lower analyst following and longer forecast 
horizons have larger analyst forecast errors, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Lang, Lins, and Miller 2004; Tan, Wang, and Welker 2011).  Unlike prior studies, the 
                                                          
9
  It is calculated as the estimated coefficient on social capital (-0.00493) times the standard deviation of 
social capital (0.81). 
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coefficient on firm-specific experience is significant and positive. This may be because 
analysts with greater firm-specific experience are likely to be capable analysts who have 
more workload and thus be too busy to perform their task well. Regarding the county-
level characteristics, population growth in Column 1 is negatively associated with analyst 
forecast errors, suggesting that large population leads to denser social connections and, in 
turn, provides analysts more channels to obtain soft information to help them forecast 
earnings. The coefficient on Religion is negative and significant, indicating that my 
results are robust to religious effect. The other control variables are not statistically 
significant. Overall, these results provide evidence that social capital can increase analyst 
forecast accuracy after controlling for firm, analyst, and county characteristics. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Tests 
 
Table 4 presents the results of H2, the effect of geographic proximity on the 
association between social capital and analyst forecast accuracy. Column 1 and Column 2 
show the effect of county-level social capital on analyst forecast accuracy conditional on 
average physical distance between firms and their analyst brokerage firms. Column 1 
(Column 2) are based on the main model (model with corporate governance controls). In 
Column 2, coefficient on social capital is still negative and significant at p-value of 0.1. 
In Column 1, Log (Distance) is positively and significantly associated with analyst 
forecast errors, consistent with prior studies that geographically proximate analysts are 
more accurate than other analysts (Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 2008). In both Column 1 
(Column 2), the coefficient on the interactive term of county-level social capital with 
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logarithm of distance (Social Capital✕Log(Distance) is 0.0305 (0.0237) and statistically 
significant at the 10% (5%) level. These results provides evidence that the effect of 
county-level social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is less pronounced when analyst 
brokerage firms are far away from the firm headquarters, indicating that when analyst 
brokerage firms are far away from the firms, it is harder for analysts to collect 
information through social connections with local people. As a result, the effect of social 
capital on analyst forecast accuracy diminishes with the distance between analyst 
brokerage firms and their following firms.
10
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 5 presents the results of H3, the effect of firm operation complexity on the 
association between social capital and analyst forecast accuracy. The firm’s operation 
complexity is negatively and significantly related to analyst forecast errors. Guay, 
Samuels, and Taylor (2016) shows that managers issue more voluntary disclosure to 
mitigate information asymmetry when information is complicated. If so, analysts may 
have better information resources and can more accurately forecast earnings. The number 
of the business segments is used as the proxy for operation complexity. For both the main 
model (Column1) and model controlling for corporate governance (Column 2), I find that 
                                                          
10
 In an untabulated test, I use a dummy variable (Close )as a proxy for geographic proximity. It is defined 
as one when the average physical distance between a firm and its analyst brokerage firms is smaller than 
100 miles, otherwise zero. It shows that the coefficient on the interaction (Social Capital✕Close) is 
significantly and negatively associated with forecast errors, indicating that the effect of social capital on 
analyst forecast is more pronounced when the distance is small. This result is also consistent with these 
presented in table 4. 
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coefficient on Social Capital ✕ Segments is negative and statistically significant.11 In 
Column 1(Column 2), the coefficient is -0.00111 (-0.00168) and statistically significant 
at the 10% (5%) level, indicating that the effect of county-level social capital is more 
pronounced when firm’s operation is complex. These results support the argument that 
social capital facilitates analyst information collection and makes managers less likely to 
use complexity as a cover to manipulate earnings. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.3 Test of Analyst Forecast Informativeness  
 
Table 6 examines the results of H4, the effect of social capital on analyst forecast 
informativeness. Column 1 (Column 2) are based on the main model (model with 
corporate governance controls). It shows that social capital is negatively and significantly 
associated with informativeness, suggesting that investors respond to analyst forecasts 
and this response decreases with social capital. The coefficient on Social Capital in 
Column 1 (Column 2) shows that one standard deviation increase in the county-level 
social capital index reduces the analyst forecast informativeness by 0.111% (0.307%). 
These results are consistent with the argument that analyst forecasts serve a substitutional 
role for financial reporting quality. 
These results suggests that analyst forecasts in low social capital county is less 
accurate but more informative to investors. This is because managers in the low social 
                                                          
11
 Untabulated tables show that the results are robust to the measure in Markarian and Parbonetti (2007), 
where they use the number of business segments multiplied by the number of geographic segments to 
measure a firm’s complexity. 
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capital county are more likely to manipulate earnings, but analyst can correct perceived 
earnings management and bring the forecasts closer to unmanaged earnings. Therefore, 
although analyst forecasts are less accurate, they are still valuable to investors, indicating 
that analyst forecasts are viewed as an alternative resource to verify managers’ credibility. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
5 Robustness  
5.1 Headquarters Relocation Shock 
 
Following Cheng et al. (2016), I employ firms’ headquarters relocations to better 
explore the causality. I extract firms’ historical zip code from their 10-K filings 
downloaded from SEC’s EDGAR system through textual analysis. The first year with a 
different zip code from the previous year is identified as the year when a firm moves its 
headquarters. I divide the sample into firms who relocate to counties with higher social 
capital and those who relocate to counties with lower social capital. Then I estimate the 
following model separately for these two groups to exam the effect of social capital on 
analyst forecast error and analyst forecast informativeness when a firm relocates the 
headquarter. 
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   𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 
                        + 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠  
                      + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 
                     + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
                                                     +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀.                             (5) 
where post is an indicator variable that is equal to one if it is two years after the firm 
relocates its headquarter and zero otherwise.  
Table 7 presents the results of the effect of social capital on analyst forecast 
accuracy and informativeness for a five year window centered at firms’ headquarters 
relocation.
12
 Column 1(Column 3) shows that the coefficient on Post is statistically 
significant and negative for firms moving to counties with better social capital. This 
indicates that analyst forecast errors (informativeness) decrease when a firm relocates to a 
higher social capital county. In contrast, Column 2 (Column 4) shows that the coefficient 
on Post is significant and positive for firms moving to counties with lower social capital. 
This suggests that analyst forecast errors (informativeness) increase when a firm relocates 
to a lower social capital county. These results further provide causal evidence that 
increases in social capital results in a decrease in analyst forecast errors and 
informativeness and vice versa. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
                                                          
12
 I use a five-year window instead of a three-year window because it takes time for the firms to adjust their 
culture to align with culture in new counties. 
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5.2 Region Fixed Effect 
 
Figure 1a shows that high social capital counties are mainly concentrated in the 
Midwest and the Northeast areas. This creates a concern that some regional variables are 
omitted in my model. Further, if the omitted regional variables are correlated with both 
social capital and analyst forecasts, this might lead to overestimation of the effect of 
social capital on analyst forecasts. To mitigate this concern, I divide all states into four 
areas based on U.S. census classifications and code them as the West (AZ, AK, CA, CO, 
HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY), the Northeast (CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, 
PA, RI, VT), the South (AL, AR, DC, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, 
TX, VA, WV), and the Midwest (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI). 
Then I control for the regional fixed effect in the model. 
Table 8 presents the results after controlling for regional fixed effect. It shows that 
the coefficient on Social Capital in the main model (Column 1) and expanded model 
(Column 2) are still significantly and negatively associated with analyst forecast errors 
and the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to those reported in the main results, 
indicating that my results are robust to regional fixed effect. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
5.3 Accounting Quality 
 
Prior studies show that financial reporting quality plays an important role in 
reducing information asymmetries between firms and investors (Garcia-Teruel et al., 
2009; Francis et al. 2004). Since analysts are known to mainly rely on accounting 
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information to develop earnings forecasts (Lang and Lundholm1996; Barker and Imam 
2008), better financial reporting quality may lead to more accurate forecasts (Behn, Choi, 
and Kang 2008). To ensure that my results are not driven by financial reporting quality, I 
add a control variable to capture this effect. I estimate financial reporting quality as the 
standard deviation of the residual from a Dechow and Dichev (2002) regression over the 
past five years. Table 9 reports the results of this robustness test. The coefficient on 
Social Capital continues to be statistically significant and negative, and the magnitude of 
the coefficient, although slightly lower, is similar to those reported in the main results, 
suggesting that my results are robust controlling for financial reporting quality. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
5.4 Management forecast 
 
Prior research finds that analysts incorporate management guidance into their 
earing forecasts (Ajinkya, and Gift 1984; King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990; Cotter, 
Tuna, and Wysocki 2006). To mitigate the concern that my results are driven by the 
management guidance, I control the number of management guidance of annual earnings. 
Table 10 shows that social capital in Column 1 is still significantly and negatively 
associated with analyst forecast errors, indicating that social capital has the incremental 
explanatory power to the management guidance. The coefficient on the social capital in 
Column 2, however, is not significant. This might be because corporate governance 
controls already capture the effect of the management guidance.  
 [INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
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5.5 Analyst fixed effect 
 
           In order to mitigate the concern on omitted analyst characteristics, I add analyst 
fixed effect. To further rule out the possibility that my results are driven by analysts’ 
social capital, I use firms that are followed by analysts in New York as a subsample so 
that all analysts are from a locale with same social capital. The reason of using analysts in 
New York is that most of analysts are concentrated in New York. Standard errors are 
clustered at the analyst brokerage firm level to control for potentially correlated error 
terms. Table 11 shows that social capital is still significantly and negatively associated 
with analyst forecast errors after controlling analyst-firm fixed effect, indicating my 
results are not driven by omitted analyst characteristics. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
5.6 Alternative measure of social capital 
 
      To rule out the concern that my results are driven by the way I construct social capital, 
I follow prior studies (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004 and Buonanno et al., 
2009) and use organ donation as an alternative measure of social capital. Organ donation 
is an altruism action since there are neither legal nor economic incentives to donate organ, 
which is driven by internal norms and social pressure. Therefore, I use organ donation as 
an alternative measure of the social capital. I obtain the annual total number of organ 
donation in each state from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). 
Donation is defined as the per capita organ donation multiplied by 1,000 in a state.  I 
divide sample into five groups based on donation. Column 1 of Table 12 shows that 
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donation is significantly and negatively associated with analyst forecast errors in the 
highest donation group. Column 2 of Table 11 shows that coefficient on donation is 
insignificantly in the lowest donation group. These results indicate that my finding is 
robust to the alternative measure of social capital. 
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE] 
6 Conclusion 
 
This study examines whether county-level social capital affects analyst forecast 
accuracy. According to social identity theory, managers in high social capital counties are 
more likely to value mutual trust and altruism and honor legitimacy and obligation. 
Therefore, they are more likely to truthfully report the firms’ financial position. In 
addition, dense social networks in the high social capital counties can facilitate analyst’s 
information collection. In this paper, I document that firms headquartered in counties 
with higher social capital have more accurate analyst forecasts. This effect is robust to 
controlling for regional fixed effect, financial reporting quality, management guidance, 
analyst fixed effect, and alternative measure of social capital. In addition, I find that the 
effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced for firms that are 
close to the analyst brokerage firms and whose operation is complex.  I also find that 
analyst forecasts are more useful and informative to investor when firms are 
headquartered in low social capital locales. Further, I employ firm’s headquarter 
relocation to better explore causality and find that analyst forecast error and 
informativeness increases when a firm relocates to a lower social capital county and vice 
versa. 
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This study provides several contributions to the literature. First, my study extends 
an emerging stream of accounting literature that documents the effect of social capital on 
firms’ behaviors (Alm, Clark, and Leibel 2011; Jha 2013; Jha 2014; Jha and Chen 2015; 
Cheng, Wang, and Zhao 2016; Li, Tang, and Jaggi 2016). To my knowledge, it is the first 
study examines the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. Second, this 
study sheds light on the black box of analyst forecast process, providing evidence that 
social capital is an important factor that influence analysts’ ability to more accurately 
forecast earnings. Finally, this study adds evidence to analyst forecasts’ substitutional 
role for financial reporting quality and shows that analyst forecasts are more useful for 
investors when firms are headquartered in low social capital locales. 
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Appendix A  
Summary of Prior Literature 
Study Research Question The definition of social capital Key concepts  
of social capital  
The measure of social capital 
Coleman  
(1988） 
What is the concept 
of social capital and 
how it affects 
dropouts from high 
school? 
A variety of different entities, with  
two elements in common: they all 
consist of some aspect of social 
structure, and they facilitate 
certain actions of actors--whether 
personal or corporate actors-
within the structure. 
Social norms  
and networks 
Use strength of the relations between 
 parents and child as a measure of the social 
capital available to the child from the 
parent. The variables included in the model 
as measures of social capital are 
socioeconomic status, race, Hispanic 
ethnicity, number of siblings, number of 
changes in school due to family residential 
moves since fifth grade, whether mother 
worked before the child was in school, 
mother's expectation of child's education 
attainment, frequency of discussions with 
parents about personal matters, and presence 
of both parents in the household. 
Rupasingha,  
Goetz, and 
Freshwater  
(2000) 
Does social capital 
affect 
 economic growth in 
the U.S. at the county 
level? 
Social capital includes the 
institutions, the relationships, the 
attitudes, values, and beliefs that 
govern interactions among people 
and contribute to economic and 
social development 
Social norms  
and networks 
Social capital is measured using the density 
 of membership organizations, crime rate, 
charitable giving and voter participation. 
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Rupasingha,  
Goetz, and 
Freshwater 
(2006) 
What are factors 
affecting in  
production of social 
capital? 
Social capital is a collective 
manifestation of   
behaviors, attitudes, and values of 
individual members of a 
community.  
Social norms  
and networks 
A county-level index of social capital is 
created by extracting principal components 
from the percentage of voters who voted in 
presidential elections, the county-level 
response rate to the Census Bureau's 
decennial census, the number of tax-exempt 
non-profit organizations from the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics and the 
associational density variable.  
Whiteley 
 (2000) 
Does social capital 
affect cross-national 
economic growth? 
Social capital is defined as the 
willingness of citizens to trust 
others including members of their 
own family, fellow citizens, and 
people in general. 
Social norms A country-level index of social capital is 
created by extracting principal components 
from the level of trust in family members, 
fellow nationals and people in general. The 
trust variables are from the World Values 
surveys. 
Helliwell and 
Putnam 
 (1995) 
Why are there Italy 
regional differences 
in output per capita? 
Social capital is defined as 
features of social organizations 
such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit. 
Social norms  
and networks 
Social capital is measured by an index of the 
extent of civic community, a measure of 
institutional performance, and surveys of 
citizen satisfaction with their regional 
government. 
Knack and 
Keefer  
(1997) 
Does social capital 
have an economic 
payoff? 
Social capital is defined as trust, 
cooperative norms, and 
associations within groups. 
Trust and  
norms 
Social capital is measured using indicators 
of trust and civic norms from the World 
Values Surveys 
Alm, Clark,   
and Leibel 
(2011) 
What is the role of 
social capital on tax 
compliance? 
They follow Putnam (2007) 
definition that social capital is 
people's beliefs and actions that 
contribute to social networks and 
the associated norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness. 
Networks 
and norms 
Tax filing compliance is used as a voluntary 
measure of social capital. The filing rates 
for counties in the United States come from 
Internal Revenue Service. 
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Jha (2013) Does social capital 
affect financial 
reports? 
Social capital is considered to be a 
"good culture" that is the product 
of both the dense network and the 
altruistic norms and is conducive 
to mutual cooperation. 
Social norms 
and networks 
Conducting a principal component analysis, 
the author constructs a social capital index 
of census response rate, electoral 
participation rate, county's total civic, social, 
professional, political organizations, and 
nongovernment organizations normalized by 
the population. 
Jha and Chen 
(2015) 
Does social capital 
affect audit fees? 
Following Woolcock (2001), the 
authors define social capital as the 
norms and the networks that 
facilitate collective action. 
Social norms  
and networks 
Conducting a principal component analysis, 
the author constructs a social capital index 
of census response rate, electoral 
participation rate, county's total civic, social, 
professional, political organizations, and 
nongovernment organizations normalized by 
the population. 
Jha and Cox 
(2015) 
Does social capital 
affect corporate 
social 
responsibility(CSR)? 
Following Woolcock (2001), the 
authors define social capital as the 
norms and the networks that 
facilitate collective action. 
Social norms  
and networks 
Conducting a principal component analysis, 
the author constructs a social capital index 
of census response rate, electoral 
participation rate, county's total civic, social, 
professional, political organizations, and 
nongovernment organizations normalized by 
the population. 
Cheng,Wang,  
Zhang, and  
Zhao (2015) 
Does social capital 
affect firms' cost of 
bank loans? 
Following Woolcock (2001), the 
authors define social capital as the 
norms and the networks that 
facilitate collective action. 
Social norms  
and networks 
Conducting a principal component analysis, 
the author constructs a social capital index 
of census response rate, electoral 
participation rate, county's total civic, social, 
professional, political organizations, and 
nongovernment organizations normalized by 
the population. 
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Li, Tang and  
Jaggi (2016) 
Does social capital 
affect the municipal 
bond market? 
Following Woolcock (2001), the 
authors define social capital as the 
norms and the networks that 
facilitate collective action. 
Social norms  
and networks 
Conducting a principal component analysis,  
the author constructs a social capital index 
of census response rate, electoral 
participation rate, county's total civic, social, 
professional, political organizations , and 
nongovernment organizations normalized by 
the population . 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable 
Forecast Errors 
The average of all absolute value of differences between analyst forecast 
and its actual target earnings, divided by the stock price at the beginning 
of the year. 
Informativeness Informativeness is the sum of the absolute market adjusted returns (𝑅𝑚) 
on the analyst forecasts revision dates (m) for a firm (i) in a given fiscal 
year (t), scaled by the number of analyst forecast revision days for the 
firm in the fiscal year (𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑚). Similar to Frankel, Kothari, and 
Weber 2006, I delete all analyst report dates within a 3-day window 
centered on quarterly and annual earnings announcement dates to avoid 
contaminating by earnings announcement period volatility. INFO is 
constructed to measure the average informativeness of an analyst report 
date for a firm. 
 INFO𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ |𝑅𝑚|
𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑡=1
𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
    
Variable of Interest 
Social Capital 
The social capital is measured at the county level. It is constructed using 
the principal component analysis on four factors: the census response 
rate, the voter rate, the number of social and civic associations and the 
number of nongovernment in each county. The census response rate is the 
response rate to the Census Bureau’s decennial census. The voter rate is 
the number of votes cast scaled by the population above 18 years old 
times 100. The number of social and civic associations is the sum of the 
religious organizations, civic and social associations, business 
associations, political organizations, professional organizations, labor 
organizations, bowling centers, physical fitness facilities, public golf 
courses, sports clubs, managers and promoters, membership sports and 
recreation clubs, and membership organizations. The total amount is 
divided by 12 because there are 12 different categories and then scaled by 
the population. The number of nongovernment organizations is the sum 
of nongovernment organizations, excluding the ones with an international 
focus, divided by population multiplied by 10,000. All data comes from 
Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NERCRD). Since 
NERCRD data are only available for 1990, 1997, 2005, and 2009, I 
linearly interpolate values to fill the missing years. 
 
Firm Characteristics Control 
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Ln(Distance) 
The natural log of the mean of all spatial distances between a firm and its 
analyst brokerage firms. I obtain analyst brokerage firm zip code from 
Nelson's Directory of Investment Research for 2001–2008, and firm 
headquarter zip code is extracted from 10-K filing restored on SEC's 
EDGAR.  
Segments The number of business segments in Compustat-Segments. 
Size 
 
Natural log of the book value of assets (AT). 
 
Market-to-book 
The ratio of market value (PRCC_F * CSHO) to book value of common 
equity (CEQ). 
Intangible  
The ratio of intangible assets (INTAN) to previous year’s total assets 
(AT) for firm i in a fiscal period. 
Return Volatility 
The standard deviation of monthly stock return for firm i in a fiscal 
period. 
Stock Turnover 
Number of shares traded in year t, divided by the firm's average number 
of shares outstanding  for firm i in a fiscal period. 
Stock Return 
Annual stock return for firm i in a fiscal period, adjusted for 
contemporaneous annual market return. 
Issuance 
Indicator variable equals to 1 if firm i issued equity or debt greater than 
5% of total assets in a fiscal period, 0 otherwise.  
AQ 
Accounting quality is defined as standard deviation of discretionary 
accruals, calculated as the standard deviation of the residual from a 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) regression over 5 years. 
MgtFcst 
The number of annual earnings forecasts issued by firm i in a fiscal 
period.  
Analyst Characteristics Control 
nAnalysts Total number of I/B/E/S analysts covering firm i in a fiscal period. 
Horizon 
Mean of age in years between all analyst most recent forecast date and 
the corresponding announcement date of actual earnings for firm i in a 
fiscal period. 
Ln(nFirm) 
Number of firms analyst j covers in year t in the I/B/E/S database for firm 
i. I take the natural log of the mean of this value for firm i in a fiscal 
period. 
Ln(Genex) 
Analyst general experience is defined as the number of years between 
analyst j's first forecast in I/B/E/S and his/her current forecast for firm i in 
a fiscal period. Then I take the natural log of the mean of this value for 
firm i in a fiscal period. 
Ln(Firmex) 
Analyst firm-specific experience is defined as the time interval in years 
between analyst j's first forecast for a particular firm i in I/B/E/S database 
and his/her current forecast for firm i in a fiscal period.  I take the natural 
log of the mean of this value for firm i in a fiscal period. 
Ln(Brsize) 
Brokerage size is defined as the number of analysts working for the 
I/B/E/S brokerage with which analyst j is associated. I take the natural log 
of the mean of this value for firm i in a fiscal period.  
County Characteristics Control 
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Religion 
The percentage of religious adherents in the county (from Association of 
Religion Data Archive (ARDA)). 
Rural 
Indicator variable equals to 1 if the county's population density is less 
than the median, 0 otherwise (from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA)). 
Ln(Income) 
Natural log of The income per capita in a county divided by the 
Consumer Price Index (from Census Bureau). 
Ln(Population) Natural log of the county's population (from BEA). 
PopGrowth 
Percentage of the population growth of the county since the previous year 
(from BEA). 
Education 
Percentage of persons 25 years and over with a bachelor's degrees or 
higher in the U.S. county population (from Census Bureau). 
Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to one of the following 
SIC groups: 2833-2836 (pharmaceuticals), 3570-3577 (computers), 
3600-3674 (electronics), 7371-7379 (programming), and 8731-8734 
(R&D services), and 0 otherwise.  
Dual 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Board of Chair, 0 
otherwise. 
Indpt Percent Percentage of independent directors on the board (from ISS database). 
Financial Expert 
Number of directors with financial or accounting expertise divided by 
the total number of directors on the board (from ISS database). 
Alternative Measure of Social Capital 
Donation 
The annual total number of organ donation in each state, divided by total 
population in each state and multiplied by 1,000. The annual total 
number of organ donation comes from the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN).  
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Figure 1a: Social capital by state 
 
 
This figure depicts the variations in social capital measured at the state level in 2009. 
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Figure 1b: Analyst forecast error by state 
 
 
 This figure depicts the variations in analyst forecast error measured at the state level in 2009. 
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Figure 1c: Analyst forecast informativeness by state 
 
 
 
 This figure depicts the variations in analyst forecast informativeness measured at the state level in 2009. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics                                                            
Panel A: Sample Selection 
  
Number of firm-year 
observations 
Compustat firms with available data to construct social capital index from 
NERCRD from 1990 to 2000 
181,765 
Observations after eliminating missing analysts characteristics data from 
I/B/E/S 
46,066 
Observations after eliminating missing firm characteristics data from 
Compustat and CRSP 
38,711 
Observations after eliminating missing county characteristics data 36,376 
Final sample after eliminating financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) 
and utilities industries (SIC codes 4000-4999)  
28,005 
Sample after eliminating missing corporate governance variables 12,140 
This panel presents the sample selection procedure. My final sample includes28,005 firm-years from 1990 to 2009. The 
sample with corporate governance variables includes12,140 firm-years from 1990-2009. 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
  #Observations Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  
Median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forecast Errors 28,005 0.06 0.19 0.01 
Social Capital 28,005 -0.54 0.81 -0.49 
Informativeness 23,875 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Segments 28,005 2.64 2.12 2.00 
Distance 8,111 1,128.63 857.46 968.58 
Log(Distance) 8,111 6.45 1.48 6.88 
AQ 25,647 0.09 0.09 0.06 
Size 28,005 6.33 1.82 6.23 
Market-to-Book 28,005 3.41 4.68 2.36 
Intangible  28,005 0.19 0.26 0.10 
Return Volatility 28,005 0.18 0.16 0.14 
Stock Turnover 28,005 2.00 1.76 1.46 
Stock Return 28,005 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Issuance 28,005 0.88 0.32 1.00 
nAnalysts 28,005 10.11 8.79 7.00 
Horizon 28,005 0.34 0.13 0.32 
nFirm 28,005 15.77 5.16 15.13 
Genex 28,005 8.27 2.86 8.17 
Firmex 28,005 3.40 1.84 3.00 
Brsize 28,005 61.95 36.67 58.39 
Ln(nFirm) 28,005 2.71 0.32 2.72 
Ln(Genex) 28,005 2.04 0.40 2.10 
Ln(Firmex) 28,005 1.07 0.56 1.10 
Ln(Brsize) 28,005 3.90 0.77 4.07 
Religion 28,005 0.53 0.11 0.53 
Rural 28,005 0.02 0.14 0.00 
Income 28,005 42,434.07 15,690.92 39,303.00 
Population 28,005 1,500,000 1,760,000 925,000 
Ln(Income) 28,005 10.60 0.32 10.58 
Ln(Population) 28,005 13.73 1.06 13.74 
PopGrowth 28,005 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Education 28,005 0.34 0.10 0.33 
Litigation Risk 12,140 0.28 0.45 0.00 
Dual 12,140 0.29 0.45 1.00 
Indpt Percent 12,140 0.69 0.17 0.71 
Financial Expert 12,140 0.03 0.09 0.00 
Donation 28,005 0.04 0.01 0.04 
MgtFcst 28,005 5.84 9.37 5.84 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The table provides the mean, median, and standard deviation. All 
data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Forecast Errors 
 
-0.10 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.39 0.06 0.24 0.16 -0.13 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 
(2) Social Capital -0.03 
 
-0.07 0.06 -0.44 -0.10 0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.25 0.05 -0.06 -0.17 0.03 -0.15 
(3) Informativeness 0.21 -0.07 
 
-0.22 0.13 0.18 -0.50 -0.23 -0.11 0.60 0.45 -0.24 -0.01 -0.21 0.04 -0.09 
(4) Segments -0.01 0.05 -0.18 
 
-0.10 -0.05 0.36 -0.07 0.17 -0.17 -0.24 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.02 
(5) Ln(Distance) 0.02 -0.32 0.07 -0.08 
 
0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 0.17 0.28 0.01 0.04 0.19 -0.07 0.03 
(6) AQ 0.11 -0.09 0.26 -0.12 0.05 
 
-0.18 0.01 -0.02 0.17 0.14 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 
(7) Size -0.06 0.04 -0.40 0.47 -0.05 -0.32 
 
0.09 0.09 -0.30 -0.23 -0.01 -0.01 0.54 -0.09 0.05 
(8) Market-to-Book -0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 
 
-0.03 -0.21 -0.11 0.14 0.07 0.25 0.09 -0.10 
(9) Intangible Asset 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 
 
-0.18 -0.19 0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.18 -0.06 
(10) Return Volatility 0.18 -0.05 0.39 -0.16 0.06 0.15 -0.32 -0.01 -0.05 
 
0.48 -0.29 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
(11) Stock Turnover 0.03 -0.12 0.22 -0.03 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.10 
 
-0.13 0.02 0.24 -0.19 0.09 
(12) Stock Return -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.18 0.10 
 
0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.03 
(13) Issuance 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.12 -0.05 0.10 0.27 
 
0.02 -0.02 0.02 
(14) nAnalysts -0.09 -0.06 -0.24 0.18 0.13 -0.15 0.68 0.12 0.03 -0.17 0.31 0.06 0.06 
 
-0.09 -0.01 
(15) Horizon 0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 -0.10 
 
-0.18 
(16) Ln(nFirm) -0.01 -0.04 -0.14 0.02 0.03 -0.15 0.20 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 0.12 -0.09 
 
(17) Ln(Genex) -0.02 0.07 -0.18 0.18 -0.05 -0.21 0.38 -0.06 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.17 -0.06 0.38 
(18) Ln(Firmex) -0.03 0.10 -0.28 0.28 -0.08 -0.27 0.54 -0.09 -0.07 -0.22 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.33 0.00 0.28 
(19) Ln(Brsize) -0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.20 -0.01 -0.20 0.55 0.03 0.06 -0.16 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.41 -0.03 0.20 
(20) Religion -0.02 0.17 -0.08 0.07 -0.36 -0.08 0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.05 
(21) Rural -0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 
(22) Ln(Income) 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.09 -0.34 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.04 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.11 0.01 -0.12 
(23) Ln(Population) 0.02 -0.53 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.01 
(24) PopGrowth 0.02 -0.28 0.02 -0.09 0.15 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.14 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.07 
(25) Education 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.00 -0.24 0.14 -0.03 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.03 -0.10 
(26) Litigation Risk 0.00 -0.06 0.22 -0.17 0.09 0.21 -0.22 0.12 -0.05 0.12 0.19 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.12 
(27) Dual -0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.13 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.24 -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.04 
(28) Indpt Percent -0.03 0.04 -0.10 0.20 -0.04 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 
(29) Financial Expert 0.01 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.08 0.25 0.14 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 
(30) Donation -0.01 0.38 -0.02 0.17 -0.27 0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.30 0.33 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 
(31) MgtFcst -0.04 0.02 -0.10 0.15 -0.01 -0.05 0.29 -0.01 0.16 -0.17 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.28 -0.08 -0.03 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
  (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) 
(1) Forecast Errors -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.15 -0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.03 -0.12 
(2) Social Capital 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.08 -0.57 -0.28 0.23 -0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.50 0.12 
(3) Informativeness -0.28 -0.38 -0.16 -0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.20 -0.17 -0.15 0.21 -0.13 -0.18 
(4) Segments 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.15 0.08 0.18 -0.01 0.09 0.10 
(5) Ln(Distance) -0.14 -0.14 -0.10 -0.45 -0.06 -0.06 0.34 0.15 -0.05 0.14 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.48 -0.16 
(6) AQ -0.25 -0.21 -0.09 -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.17 
(7) Size 0.36 0.55 0.43 0.05 -0.09 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.10 0.12 0.23 -0.01 0.03 0.20 
(8) Market-to-Book -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.09 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.01 -0.18 0.02 0.12 
(9) Intangible Asset 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.29 
(10) Return Volatility -0.23 -0.28 -0.07 -0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.16 -0.12 -0.12 0.27 -0.18 -0.24 
(11) Stock Turnover -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 -0.20 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.23 -0.28 -0.01 0.27 -0.18 -0.16 
(12) Stock Return -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.27 -0.04 -0.55 0.06 0.07 
(13) Issuance -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
(14) nAnalysts -0.05 0.13 0.14 -0.12 -0.08 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.19 0.03 
(15) Horizon -0.15 -0.16 0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.08 -0.16 -0.01 0.05 
(16) Ln(nFirm) 0.26 0.19 -0.10 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.14 -0.13 -0.21 -0.17 0.06 0.11 0.02 -0.05 
(17) Ln(Genex) 
 
0.67 0.23 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.33 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.14 
(18) Ln(Firmex) 0.55 
 
0.27 0.10 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.23 0.01 0.24 0.08 0.13 0.10 
(19) Ln(Brsize) 0.30 0.28 
 
0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.21 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 0.03 
(20) Religion 0.04 0.06 0.01 
 
0.02 0.22 -0.02 -0.15 0.10 -0.15 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.22 0.08 
(21) Rural -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 
-0.06 -0.15 0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
(22) Ln(Income) -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.13 -0.07 
 
0.23 -0.05 0.84 0.14 -0.20 0.10 0.19 -0.08 0.09 
(23) Ln(Population) -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.27 0.24 
 
-0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.33 -0.07 
(24) PopGrowth -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.22 0.02 -0.16 -0.10 
 
-0.03 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 0.16 -0.23 -0.02 
(25) Education -0.08 -0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.82 0.18 -0.06 
 
0.21 -0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.06 
(26) Litigation Risk -0.22 -0.19 -0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.14 0.07 -0.01 0.23 
 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 
(27) Dual 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.07 -0.01 -0.18 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 
 
-0.05 -0.52 -0.01 0.03 
(28) Indpt Percent 0.07 0.15 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.20 0.07 -0.07 0.12 -0.03 -0.06 
 
0.13 0.08 0.12 
(29) Financial Expert 0.02 0.05 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.48 0.17 
 
-0.03 0.01 
(30) Donation 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.24 -0.14 -0.25 0.12 -0.07 -0.04 0.22 0.07 
 
0.14 
(31) MgtFcst 0.12 0.18 0.14 -0.06 -0.03 0.28 0.03 -0.07 0.18 0.01 -0.16 0.21 0.16 0.25   
This table presents Pearson (lower left) and Spearman (upper right) correlations among variables used in the analyses. The sample period covers from 1989 to 
2009.  Correlations that are significantly different from zero at the p<0.05 level are in bold. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
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Table 3: The effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy 
Dependent Variable Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital -0.00493*** -0.00490** 
(-2.79) (-1.98) 
Size 0.00258 *  0.00321    
(1.88)    (1.41)    
Market-to-Book -0.00266*** -0.00278*** 
(-11.26)    (-5.92)    
Intangible  0.0357*** 0.0207**   
(6.81)    (2.11)    
Return Volatility 0.125*** 0.206*** 
(12.91)    (6.54)    
Stock Turnover 0.00316*** 0.00219    
(5.06)    (1.80)    
Stock Return -0.00854    0.0483    
(-0.13)    (0.53)    
Issuance 0.000727    -0.00591    
(0.21)    (-0.87)    
nAnalyst -0.00174*** -0.00104*** 
(-7.55)    (-4.44)    
Horizon 0.0603*** 0.0453***  
(7.66)    (2.80)    
Ln(nFirm) -0.00126    -0.00677    
(-0.33)    (-0.97)    
Ln(Genex) -0.00386    0.00308    
(-1.15)    (0.54)    
Ln(Firmex) 0.00795***  0.00740    
(2.84)    (1.67)    
Ln(Brsize) 0.00161    0.00663**   
(0.96)    (2.17)    
Religion -0.0236**   -0.0223*    
(-2.49)    (-1.88)    
Rural -0.00496    -0.00462    
(-0.71)    (-0.55)    
ln(Income) 0.00873    0.00113    
(1.26)    (0.12)    
ln(Population) -0.000982    -0.00133    
(-0.68)    (-0.63)    
PopGrowth -0.202**   -0.0725    
(-2.21)    (-0.59)    
Education 0.0211    0.0248    
(0.92)    (0.77)    
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Adjusted R-Squared 0.0911          0.1096 
This table presents tests of the effect of county-level social capital on analyst forecast accuracy. Column 1 presents the 
result of the main model and Column 2 shows the result for expanded model. All models include year and industry 
fixed effects.  All regressions are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk   -0.00128    
 (-0.35)    
Dual  -0.00186    
 (-0.59)    
Indpt Percent  0.00141    
 (0.14)    
Financial Expert  -0.0217    
 (-1.17)    
     Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 28,005 12,140 
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Table 4: The impact of geographic proximity on the effect of social capital 
Dependent Variable Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital -0.0602 -0.135* 
(-0.61) (-1.95) 
Ln(Distance) 
 
0.0577** 0.0147 
 (2.56) (1.3) 
Social Capital ✕ Ln(Distance) 
 
0.0305* 0.0237** 
 (1.89) (2.26) 
Size 0.0221* 0.0233** 
(1.77) (2.28) 
Market-to-Book -0.0184*** -0.0195*** 
(-4.55) (-3.92) 
Intangible  0.0329 0.170*** 
(0.79) (3.69) 
Return Volatility 0.190*** 0.581*** 
(2.92) (13.73) 
Stock Turnover 0.0366*** -0.00850* 
(3.68) (-1.65) 
Stock Return 0.561 -6.734*** 
(0.35) (-3.34) 
Issuance 0.0645 0.0840** 
(1.07) (2.02) 
nAnalyst -0.00536** 0.000967 
(-2.40) (0.68) 
Horizon 0.0843 -0.0945 
(0.74) (-0.91) 
Ln(nFirm) 0.233*** 0.0762 
(3.06) (1.10) 
Ln(Genex) -0.0800** 0.207** 
(-1.97) (2.51) 
Ln(Firmex) 0.0199 -0.0830 
(0.68) (-1.62) 
Ln(Brsize) -0.0452 0.0548* 
(-1.62) (1.68) 
Religion -0.141 -0.0817 
(-0.78) (-0.57) 
Rural 0.0110 -0.0127 
(0.19) (-0.26) 
ln(Income) 0.396** 0.251*** 
(2.49) (3.90) 
ln(Population) 0.0590*** 0.0149 
(3.08) (1.31) 
PopGrowth 3.760** 1.668 
(2.62) (1.31) 
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Education -1.620*** -0.780*** 
(-3.10) (-3.28) 
    
 
Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk  0.0525    
 (1.12) 
Dual  0.0571 
 (1.49) 
Indpt Percent  -0.0555 
 (-0.46) 
Financial Expert  -0.692*** 
 (-3.15) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 8,111 4,799 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5627 0.6299 
This table presents tests of the effect of geographic proximity on the association between social capital and analyst 
forecast accuracy. Column 1 and Column 2 show the regression of analyst forecast error on county-level social capital 
and its interaction with a firm’s geographic proximity with its analysts. Column 1 (Column 2) are based on the main 
model (model with corporate governance controls. All models include year and industry fixed effects.  All regressions 
are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
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Table 5: The impact of operation complexity on the effect of social capital 
Dependent Variable Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital -0.00192 0.000356 
(-0.87)    (0.12) 
Complexity 
 
-0.0013* -0.00112 
 (-1.90)    (-1.49)    
Social Capital ✕ Complexity 
 
-0.00111* -0.00168***  
 (-1.82)    (-2.69)    
Size 0.00323** 0.00357 
(2.11) (1.45) 
Market-to-Book -0.00266*** -0.00279*** 
(-11.21) (-5.91) 
Intangible  0.0357*** 0.0203** 
(6.80) (2.07) 
Return Volatility 0.125*** 0.206*** 
(12.92) (6.55) 
Stock Turnover 0.00311*** 0.00217* 
(4.98) (1.80) 
Stock Return -0.00681 0.0491 
(-0.10) (0.54) 
Issuance 0.000661 -0.00578 
(0.19) (-0.86) 
nAnalyst -0.00179*** -0.00107*** 
(-7.67) (-4.34) 
Horizon 0.0603*** 0.0455*** 
(7.66) (2.83) 
Ln(nFirm) -0.00123 -0.00660 
(-0.33) (-0.94) 
Ln(Genex) -0.00394 0.00272 
(-1.18) (0.48) 
Ln(Firmex) 0.00812*** 0.00787* 
(2.92) (1.79) 
Ln(Brsize) 0.00142 0.00646** 
(0.83) (2.13) 
Religion -0.0243** -0.0245** 
(-2.58) (-2.06) 
Rural -0.00541 -0.00592 
(-0.77) (-0.71) 
ln(Income) 0.00904 0.00126 
(1.31) (0.13) 
ln(Population) -0.000889 -0.00144 
(-0.61) (-0.65) 
PopGrowth -0.204** -0.0905 
(-2.20) (-0.73) 
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Education 0.0201 0.0263 
(0.87) (0.79) 
                                                              Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk  -0.00161 
 (-0.43) 
Dual  -0.00189 
 (-0.61) 
Indpt Percent  0.00116 
 (0.11) 
Financial Expert  -0.022 
 (-1.18) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 28,005 12,140 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0913 0.1103 
This table presents tests of the effect of financial reporting complexity on the association between social capital and 
analyst forecast accuracy. Column 1 and Column 2 show the regression of analyst forecast error on county-level social 
capital and its interaction with financial reporting complexity. Column 1 (Column 2) are based on the main model 
(model with corporate governance controls). All models include year and industry fixed effects. All regressions are 
clustered by county. ). All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition.   
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Table 6: Social capital and analyst forecast informativeness 
Dependent Variable: Informativeness 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital 
-0.00137** -0.00379** 
(-2.55) (-2.32) 
Size 
-0.00538*** -0.00879*** 
(-22.45) (-6.38) 
Market-to-Book 
-0.0000927 -0.000141 
(-1.41) (-0.91) 
Intangible  
-0.00112 -0.00326 
(-1.18) (-0.74) 
Return Volatility 
0.0457*** 0.0488*** 
(12.61) (5.37) 
Stock Turnover 
0.00368*** 0.00407*** 
(11.04) (3.89) 
Stock Return 
0.0378** 0.0751* 
(2.41) (1.83) 
Issuance 
-0.000566 -0.00717* 
(-0.67) (-1.65) 
nAnalyst -0.000409*** -0.000282** 
(-7.70) (-2.09) 
Horizon 
0.00255 0.0333*** 
(1.34) (3.64) 
Ln(nFirm) 
0.000178 -0.0103 
(0.21) (-1.63) 
Ln(Genex) 
-0.0000101 0.00285 
(-0.01) (0.75) 
Ln(Firmex) 
-0.00270*** 0.000705 
(-4.19) (0.29) 
Ln(Brsize) 
0.00357*** 0.00362 
(6.29) (1.58) 
Religion 
-0.0100** -0.0163* 
(-2.49) (-1.65) 
Rural 
-0.00362** -0.00424 
(-2.39) (-0.89) 
ln(Income) 
-0.00242 -0.0133 
(-0.83) (-1.60) 
ln(Population) 
-0.000161 -0.00291** 
(-0.50) (-2.21) 
PopnGrowth 
-0.0510 -0.0174 
(-1.62) (-0.16) 
Education 
0.0221** 0.0438 
(2.80) (1.58) 
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  Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk 
 0.00328 
 (0.86) 
Dual 
 0.00399* 
 (1.82) 
Indpt Percent 
 -0.0162** 
 (-2.60) 
Financial Expert 
 0.00770 
 (0.59) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 23,875 10,845 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.02695 0.0296 
This table presents tests of the effect of social capital on analyst forecast informativeness. Column 1 (Column 2) is 
based on the main model (model with corporate governance controls). All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. All regressions are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition. 
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Table 7: Firms’ headquarters relocation 
          Dependent Variable: Forecast Errors Informativeness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post_Relocation to higher 
social capital counties 
-0.0173**  -0.00763*  
(-2.30)  (-1.81)  
Post_Relocation to lower  
social capital counties 
 0.0542*  0.00727** 
 (1.86)  (2.34) 
Size 0.00124 0.0123** -0.00524 -0.00239 
(0.24) (2.03) (-1.62) (-1.24) 
Market-to-Book -0.000833 0.0000487** -0.000113 -0.000426 
(-0.75) (2.58) (-0.31) (-1.36) 
Intangible Asset 0.0150* -0.0201 0.0103*** 0.0132 
(1.87) (-0.37) (3.05) (1.56) 
ReturnVolatility -0.0225 0.294** 0.00319 -0.00655 
(-0.79) (2.45) (0.31) (-0.45) 
StockTurnover -0.00165 0.00415 0.00128 0.00133* 
(-0.63) (1.24) (1.23) (1.93) 
StockReturn -0.0190 -0.221 -0.0105 -0.196 
(-0.04) (-0.19) (-0.08) (-1.51) 
Issuance 0.00707 -0.0681 -0.000264 0.00289 
(0.29) (-0.74) (-0.03) (0.29) 
nAnalyst -0.00108 -0.00261** -0.0000789 0.000119 
(-1.41) (-2.60) (-0.19) (0.51) 
Horizon 0.0439 0.154* 0.0189 0.0181 
(1.34) (1.68) (1.04) (0.77) 
Ln(nFirm) -0.0575* -0.0137 -0.0131 0.00651 
(-1.92) (-0.65) (-1.22) (1.41) 
Ln(Genex) -0.00205 0.0223 -0.00422 -0.00480 
(-0.17) (0.66) (-0.71) (-1.04) 
Ln(Firmex) -0.0134 0.00114 0.00443 -0.00130 
(-0.95) (0.05) (0.92) (-0.48) 
Ln(Brsize) 0.0180** -0.0255* 0.00591* -0.00310 
(2.43) (-1.91) (1.72) (-1.14) 
Religion -0.0000915* 0.000169 -0.0000349 0.0000179 
(-1.86) (1.66) (-1.51) (1.35) 
Rural -0.0367* 0 -0.0113 0 
(-1.69) (.) (-1.07) (.) 
ln(Income) 0.0289 -0.0879** 0.00477 0.0139 
(0.79) (-2.34) (0.31) (1.07) 
ln(Population) -0.0000660 0.00387 -0.000936 -0.00110 
(-0.01) (0.50) (-0.47) (-0.65) 
PopGrowth 0.0960 -0.957 -0.169 0.189 
(0.33) (-1.52) (-1.07) (1.44) 
Education -0.0000306 0.00361*** -0.000319 -0.0000142 
(-0.03) (2.81) (-0.92) (-0.04) 
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Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total N 244 255 211 215 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1402 0.3663 0.3790 0.4759 
 This table presents the results of the effect of social capital on analyst forecast accuracy (informativeness) surrounding 
firms’ headquarters relocation. Column 1 (Column 3) shows the result for firms whose headquarters move to a county 
with better social capital. Column 2 (Column 4) shows the result for firms whose headquarters move to a county with 
lower social capital. All regressions are based on the main model, include year and industry fixed effects, and are 
clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition.   
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Table 8: Regional fixed effect 
Dependent Variable: Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital -0.00641*** -0.00608** 
(-3.39) (-2.04) 
Size 0.00242* 0.00311 
(1.74) (1.36) 
Market-to-Book -0.00268*** -0.00279*** 
(-11.28) (-5.91) 
Intangible  0.0357*** 0.0208** 
(6.79) (2.12) 
ReturnVolatility 0.125*** 0.206*** 
(12.94) (6.54) 
Stock Turnover 0.00321*** 0.00223* 
(5.05) (1.80) 
Stock Return -0.00813 0.0489 
(-0.12) (0.54) 
Issuance 0.000818 -0.00580 
(0.24) (-0.86) 
nAnalyst -0.00172*** -0.00103*** 
(-7.47) (-4.40) 
Horizon 0.0603*** 0.0450*** 
(7.64) (2.78) 
Ln(nFirm) -0.00117 -0.00661 
(-0.31) (-0.95) 
Ln(Genex) -0.00401 0.00298 
(-1.20) (0.52) 
Ln(Firmex) 0.00787*** 0.00743* 
(2.81) (1.67) 
Ln(Brsize) 0.00175 0.00676** 
(1.04) (2.16) 
Religion -0.0271** -0.0249 
(-2.06) (-1.60) 
Rural -0.00509 -0.00559 
(-0.73) (-0.65) 
ln(Income) 0.00944 0.00123 
(1.33) (0.13) 
ln(Population) -0.00119 -0.00153 
(-0.86) (-0.71) 
PopGrowth -0.182* -0.0368 
(-1.84) (-0.28) 
Education 0.0264 0.0288 
(1.12) (0.86) 
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  Corporate Governance Control  
 Litigation Risk   -0.00123 
 (-0.33) 
Dual  -0.00186 
 (-0.59) 
Indpt Percent  0.000942 
 (0.09) 
Financial Expert  -0.0219 
 (-1.18) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 28,005 
 
12,140 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0912 0.1097 
This table presents the results after controlling for regional fixed effect. Column 1 (Column 2) is based on the main 
model (model with corporate governance controls). All models include year, industry and region fixed effects. All 
regressions are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition.   
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Table 9: Controlling for accounting quality 
Dependent Variable: Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital -0.00378* -0.00470* 
(-1.95) (-1.74) 
AQ 0.159*** 0.172*** 
(9.36) (5.68) 
Size 0.00473*** 0.00457** 
(3.44) (2.00) 
Market-to-Book -0.00285*** -0.00277*** 
(-9.75) (-6.02) 
Intangible Asset 0.0299*** 0.0228** 
(5.27) (2.39) 
Return Volatility 0.127*** 0.194*** 
(11.25) (6.07) 
Stock Turnover 0.00241*** 0.00175 
(3.67) (1.41) 
Stock Return 0.0121 0.0468 
(0.18) (0.50) 
Issuance -0.00140 -0.00437 
(-0.37) (-0.65) 
nAnalyst -0.00174*** -0.00111*** 
(-8.09) (-4.84) 
Horizon 0.0551*** 0.0451*** 
(6.97) (2.72) 
Ln(nFirm) -0.00111 -0.00811 
(-0.27) (-1.19) 
Ln(Genex) -0.00195 0.00322 
(-0.61) (0.57) 
Ln(Firmex) 0.00865** 0.00864* 
(2.99) (1.83) 
Ln(Brsize) 0.00286 0.00634** 
(1.59) (2.05) 
Religion -0.0213** -0.0222 
(-2.14) (-1.90) 
Rural -0.00865 -0.00710 
(-1.46) (-0.85) 
ln(Income) 0.00306 0.000946 
(0.45) (0.10) 
ln(Population) -0.000796 -0.00126 
(-0.52) (-0.58) 
PopGrowth -0.189** -0.0594 
(-2.03) (-0.48) 
Education 0.0285 0.0228 
(1.28) (0.70) 
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  Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk   -0.00303 
 (-0.85) 
Dual  -0.00176 
 (-0.58) 
Indpt Percent  0.00273 
 (0.26) 
Financial Expert  -0.0184 
 (-0.98) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 25,647 11,970 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0993 0.1167 
              
This table presents the results after controlling for accounting quality. Column 1 (Column 2) is based on the main 
model (model with corporate governance controls). All models include year and industry fixed effects. All regressions 
are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definition.                             
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Table 10: Controlling for management guidance 
Dependent Variable: Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Social Capital -0.00452**   -0.00190    
(-2.15)    (-0.58)    
MgtFcst -0.000265**   -0.0000725    
(-2.00)    (-0.49)    
Size 0.00571***   0.00632    
(2.57)    (1.62)    
Market-to-Book -0.00309*** -0.00331*** 
(-10.02)    (-6.07)    
Intangible Asset 0.0463*** 0.0211*   
(6.07)    (2.14)    
Return Volatility 0.204*** 0.340*** 
(9.91)    (4.09)    
Stock Turnover 0.00315*** 0.000769    
(4.03)    (0.45)    
Stock Return -0.134    0.0823    
(-1.47)    (0.68)    
Issuance -0.00244    0.00228    
(-0.46)    (0.25)    
nAnalyst -0.00208*** -0.00126**   
(-5.46)    (-2.41)    
Horizon 0.0871*** 0.0800*** 
(6.73)    (3.58)    
Ln(nFirm) 0.00448    0.00380    
(1.00)    (0.28)    
Ln(Genex) -0.000297    0.0134    
(-0.08)    (1.52)    
Ln(Firmex) 0.00520    -0.000471    
(1.34)    (-0.07)    
Ln(Brsize) 0.00308    0.0103***  
(1.43)    (2.70)    
Religion -0.0200    -0.0212    
(-1.61)    (-1.44)    
Rural -0.00549    -0.00403    
(-0.69)    (-0.46)    
ln(Income) 0.0133    0.0148    
(1.33)    (1.02)    
ln(Population) -0.000152    0.00141    
(-0.08)    (0.48)    
PopGrowth -0.0937    0.0510    
(-0.88)    (0.32)    
Education 0.0120    -0.0254    
(0.40)    (-0.47)    
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  Corporate Governance Control 
Litigation Risk  0.00181 
 (0.41) 
Dual  -0.00351 
 (-0.74) 
Indpt Percent  -0.0175 
 (-0.93) 
Financial Expert  -0.0340 
 (-1.56) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 28,005 12,140 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0907 0.1147 
This table presents the results after controlling for management guidance. Column 1 (Column 2) is based on the main 
model (model with corporate governance controls). All models include year and industry fixed effects. All regressions 
are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definitions.   
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Table 11: Analyst fixed effect 
Dependent Variable Forecast Errors 
  (1) 
Social Capital -0.00802*** 
(-3.14) 
Size -0.00051 
(-0.41) 
Market-to-Book 0.00005 
(1.06) 
Intangible Asset 0.01127*** 
(2.97) 
Return Volatility 0.47254*** 
(15.76) 
Stock Turnover 0.00166 
(1.30) 
Stock Return 0.78501*** 
(7.60) 
Issuance -.03715* 
(-1.90) 
Religion -0.01165 
(-0.67) 
Rural -0.00090 
(-0.06) 
ln(Income) 0.03821*** 
(3.29) 
ln(Population) -0.00497** 
(-2.30) 
PopGrowth -0.19696* 
(-1.91) 
Education -0.09124*** 
(-2.69) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Analyst-firm fixed effect Yes 
Total N 16,846 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2843 
This table presents the results after controlling for analyst-firm fixed effect. This test is performed in a subsample that 
consists of firms followed by analysts in New York. Column 1 is based on the main model without analyst 
characteristics controls since I include analyst-firm fixed effect. Year and industry are also included. This regression is 
clustered by analyst brokerage firm. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definitions.   
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Table 12: Alternative measure of social capital 
Dependent Variable: Forecast Errors 
  (1) (2) 
Donation_High -1.228**  
 (-3.19)  
Donation_Low  -0.497 
 (-0.34) 
Size 0.00158 0.0113** 
(0.52) (2.06) 
Market-to-Book -0.00327*** -0.00329*** 
(-5.31) (-7.59) 
Intangible Asset 0.0521*** 0.0478* 
(3.36) (2.56) 
Return Volatility 0.203*** 0.221*** 
(4.64) (4.84) 
Stock Turnover 0.00459** 0.00163 
(2.39) (1.30) 
Stock Return -0.153 -0.0184 
(-0.56) (-0.16) 
Issuance 0.0129 0.00328 
(1.55) (0.32) 
nAnalyst -0.00181*** -0.00251*** 
(-3.65) (-4.92) 
Horizon 0.0305 0.113*** 
(1.33) (5.41) 
Ln(nFirm) -0.00745 0.0125 
(-0.69) (1.03) 
Ln(Genex) 0.00402 -0.00632 
(0.60) (-0.94) 
Ln(Firmex) 0.0179** 0.000550 
(2.66) (0.09) 
Ln(Brsize) 0.00396 0.00229 
(0.76) (0.65) 
Religion -0.00916 -0.0429* 
(-0.25) (-1.72) 
Rural -0.00354 0.00902 
(-0.27) (0.51) 
ln(Income) 0.0101 -0.00452 
(0.42) (-0.23) 
ln(Population) 0.00348 0.00248 
(1.48) (1.13) 
PopGrowth 0.198 -0.189 
(0.52) (-0.99) 
Education 0.0417 0.0259 
(0.68) (0.48) 
 78 
 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Total N 5,601 5,601 
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.1290 0.1472 
This table presents the results using organ donation as an alternative measure of social capital. Column 1 shows the 
result for firms located in states with highest per capita organ donation. Column 2 shows the result for firms located in 
states with lowest per capita organ donation.  All regressions are based on the main model, include year and industry 
fixed effects, and are clustered by county. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definitions.   
 
  
